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DID YOU USE THIS IUD? LEGAL ADVICE IN
LAWYER ADVERTISING: ZA UDERER v. OFFICE OF
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has extended first amendment protection
to "commercial speech,"' although to a somewhat lesser degree than that
1. Commercial speech in its pure form is speech that "does no more than propose a
commercial transaction." Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973) (explaining the result in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942)). But see infra
note 5. In Valentine, the Court considered "purely commercial advertising," 316 U.S. at 54,
while in Pittsburgh Press, the Court described employment advertisements as "classic examples
of commercial speech." 413 U.S. at 385. See infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
The Court's approach to commercial speech prior to its decision in Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), see infra notes
13-24 and accompanying text, permitted outright bans on certain forms of advertising and
solicitation. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (upholding conviction for
violation of ordinance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions). For
relatively recent commentary on the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine, see Sym-
posium on Commercial Speech Held at Brooklyn Law School November 10, 1979, 46 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 389 (1980), especially Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating
Commercial Speech, id. at 437 (arguing that commercial speech deserves protection to allow
rational decision-making in the marketplace). See also Alexander & Farber, Commercial Speech
and First Amendment Theory: A Critical Exchange, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 307 (1980) (an exchange
of views on Professor Farber's theory); Barrett, "Uncharted Area"-Commercial Speech and
the First Amendment, 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 175 (1980) (noting that the Court left the definition
of commercial speech unresolved); Devine, Lawyer Advertising and the Kutak Commission: A
Refreshing Return to the Past, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 503 (1982) (the states are in the
best position to judge needs of local consumers); Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amend-
ment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372 (1979) (commercial speech may be regulated in the
aspects that serve a contractual function not directly implicating first amendment interests);
McChesney, Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered Questions
and Questionable Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1985); Reich, Preventing Deception in
Commercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 775 (1979) (suggesting framework for balancing
benefits of commercial speech against costs of deception); Roberts, Toward a General Theory
of Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 115 (1979) (generally
approving of the Court's decisions, but warning against extension of "lesser protection" to
other areas); Comment, Regulating Commercial Speech: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis,
32 BAYLOR L. REV. 235 (1980) (courts should evaluate commercial speech qualitatively to
determine extent of protection); Comment, The New Commercial Speech Doctrine and Broadcast
Advertising, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385 (1979) (commercial speech deserves full protec-
tion, but disclosures or counter-advertising may be appropriate); Comment, Standard of
Review for Regulations of Commercial Speech: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 66
MINN. L. REV. 903 (1982) (adopting Professor Farber's views for regulation of billboards).
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afforded "noncommercial speech." ' 2 The states and the federal government
remain free to prohibit commercial speech that is false, deceptive, misleading,
or that proposes an illegal transaction.' States may also regulate commercial
speech that does not possess these disfavored attributes. To be valid, however,
the regulation must further a substantial government interest in a way that
directly advances that interest.4 Although the definition of commercial speech
may be imprecise,5 the Supreme Court has held that both advertising generally
and advertisements by lawyers in particular constitute commercial speech.
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,6 the Supreme Court dem-
onstrated that only it knows which state concerns about lawyer advertise-
ments justify restrictions. In Zauderer, the Court rejected a state's interest
in regulating the use of either unsolicited legal advice or illustrations in
advertisements. By declaring that the information and illustration in one
legal advertisement were not inherently false, misleading, or deceptive, the
Court invalidated Ohio's rule banning the use of unsolicited legal advice or
illustrations in lawyers' advertisements. 7
2. Speech that has no element of commercialism or is not purely commercial in nature,
did not fall outside the protection of the first amendment even under the Court's pre-1976
approach to commercial speech cases. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975)
(ads announcing that abortions were legal in New York "did more than simply propose a
commercial transaction"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (the
advertisements in question were not "purely commercial"); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (permitting door-to-door distribution of leaflets publicizing a religious meeting). Speech
is entitled to first amendment protection even though it appears in a form which is sold for
profit. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (motion pictures); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 111 (1943) (religious literature).
3. "We foresee no obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with [deceptive or misleading
commercial speech]." Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976). In a footnote, the Court goes on to say that the common sense differences
between commercial and noncommercial speech may permit a different degree of protection
for the former, because the truthfulness of commercial speech may be more easily verifiable
by its disseminator than are other kinds of speech, and because advertising may be more
durable, and thus less easily chilled by regulation, than other forms of speech. Id. at 771 n.24.
4. These factors are part of the four-part test of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). See infra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985). "More
subject to doubt, perhaps, are the precise bounds of the category of expression that may be
termed commercial speech ...." Id. at 2275. Professor Farber has also noted the "vexing
problem of defining commercial speech." He suggests that a useful trait for identifying
commercial speech is that it serves as a means of forming commitments that are potentially
part of a contract of sale. Farber, supra note 1, at 389. Other definitions of commercial speech
include speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction, speech of interest to
a nondiverse consumer audience, and speech about a brand name product or service. See
Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional
Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 205 (1976).
6. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
7. Id. at 2276-81. See infra notes 97-107 and accompanying text.
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Concerns of federalism' and professional ethics9 raise doubts as to whether
the Zauderer decision was necessary or even correct. The Zauderer decision
demonstrates that the Supreme Court has embarked on perhaps an unlimited
series of decisions directed to passing on the validity of state regulations
concerning the ethical conduct of attorneys.' 0 State courts should make these
decisions with little danger of eroding the protections of the first amendment.
This Note demonstrates that, while the Supreme Court has outlined the
approach that the states must take in their attempts to regulate commercial
speech, the Court's decision in Zauderer has eliminated most state interests
on which the states may ground regulation of lawyer advertising. The Court
has failed to extend sufficient deference to the states in deciding what is
misleading in attorney advertising, and it has unnecessarily blurred the
distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
The 1942 Supreme Court decision of Valentine v. Chrestensen, established
the idea that certain forms of commercial speech fall outside the protection
of the first amendment.' 2 In 1976, however, the tide turned when the Court
announced in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council3 that
a state could not ban commercial speech advertising the prices of prescription
drugs.' 4 For the first time the Court extended first amendment protection to
speech that clearly had no attributes of otherwise protected, "noncommer-
cial" speech.' 5 The Court based its Virginia Pharmacy decision largely on
society's "strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.' ' 6 The
8. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 403 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that the opportunity for experimentation and innovation is one of the great virtues
of federalism). See also Justice O'Connor's dissent from Part III of the Court's decision in
Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2296-97 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
9. See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 211 (1953). Drinker noted that an
exact definition of ethics was impossible, id. at xi, but in none of his proffered definitions did
he suggest that the content of legal ethics was defined by the Constitution.
10. Zauderer is the fifth United States Supreme Court decision on the subject of lawyer
advertising since 1977.
11. 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (sustained ban on distribution of handbills).
12. Id. at 54. "We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising." Id.
13. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
14. Id. at 766-70.
15. Id. at 762-76. Cf. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975), in which the Court
rejected the contention that the first amendment did not protect advertisements for abortion
services simply because the advertisements themselves were commercial in nature. The Court
further observed that the "relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services
does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas." Id. at 825-26.
16. 425 U.S. at 764.
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Court reasoned that any interest in maintaining the professionalism of
pharmacists was not sufficient to justify keeping the public ignorant about
drug prices. 7 The Court was careful, however, to point out that commercial
speech was not totally immune from regulation.'" The state could still
establish reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions 9 and regulate com-
mercial speech that proved false, deceptive, or misleading.2"
A footnote to the decision makes it clear that the Virginia Pharmacy
Court addressed only the regulation of advertising of standardized products,
and not professional services such as those performed by doctors and law-
yers.2 ' Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion emphasized the footnoted
reservation concerning advertising by physicians and lawyers. 22 Justice Rehn-
quist dissented sharply, warning that the Court's decision would extend first
amendment protection to advertisements of potentially harmful products as
long as they did not mislead or promote an illegal product.23 He added,
"[I]f the sole limitation of permissible state proscription of advertising is
that it may not be false or -misleading, surely the difference between phar-
macists' advertising and lawyers' and doctors' advertising can be only one
of degree and not of kind." ' 24
17. Id. at 766-70.
18. Id. at 770.
19. Id. at 771. For examples of regulations of political speech or speech-related activity
that the Court has allowed, see Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (political activities on
military bases); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (political advertising
on city-owned buses); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548 (1973) (partisan political activities by federal employees); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (demonstrations near schools); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968) (draft-card burning); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (picketing near a
courthouse); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (loudspeakers in residential areas); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (requirement of permits for parades). But see Linmark
Assoc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (ban on posting real estate "For Sale"
signs struck down). While voicing various rationales for some of these regulations, the Court
usually allows a given regulation if it is content-neutral and is evenly applied regardless of the
goals of the prospective speaker. O'Brien, in particular, defined the test for justifying a
regulation if it furthered "an important or substantial government interest .. .unrelated to
the suppression of free expression .... " 391 U.S. at 377. Although the Court in Virginia
Pharmacy described Virginia's ban on price advertising as content-based, it might have reached
a different result if it had viewed the ban as being applied regardless of the motive of the
advertiser.
20. 425 U.S. at 771-72.
21. Id. at 773 n.25. "We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of
commercial advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other professions,
the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may require consideration of
quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized
products; they render professional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the
consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain
kinds of advertising." Id. (emphasis in original).
22. Id. at 774-75 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
23. Id. at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 785 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court outlined its current approach to commercial speech
most succinctly in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission.25
There, the Court struck down a ban on promotional advertising by an
electrical utility. 26 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, synthesized com-
mercial speech cases into a four-part analysis.27 The Court began the analysis
by determining whether the first amendment protects the form of expression
in question. In order to receive first amendment protection, the expression
must not be misleading or concern unlawful activity. 2s Second, the govern-
ment must assert a substantial interest in regulating the speech. 29 In the third
and fourth parts of the analysis, the Court determined both whether the
regulation directly advances the government interest asserted, and whether
the regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 30
Justice Blackmun, who authored the opinion in Virginia Pharmacy, con-
curred only in the result.3 He believed that the Court in Central Hudson
provided only "intermediate scrutiny" of restraints on commercial speech,3 2
whereas Virginia Pharmacy had promised a higher level of review. 3
Justice Rehnquist again dissented, stating that the Court "unlocked a
Pandora's box when it 'elevated' commercial speech to the level of traditional
political speech . . . -34 He noted that the final part of the Court's four-
part test left room for so many less restrictive ways of regulating that "any,
ingenious lawyer will surely seize on one of them to secure the invalidation
of [the regulation]." 35
B. The Lawyer Advertising Cases
Soon after Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court received its first op-
portunity to rule on the regulation of advertising by attorneys. In Bates v.
25. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See Comment, Advertising Restrictions on Health Care Profes-
sionals and Lawyers: The First Amendment Limitations, 50 UMKC L. REV. 82 (1981) (antic-
ipating In re R.M.J. in analyzing how Central Hudson would apply).
26. 447 U.S. at 558-59. The ban was based on the New York Public Service Commission's
finding that the electric utility system in New York State did not have sufficient fuel stocks for
the 1973-1974 winter.
27. Id. at 566.
28. Id. at 564.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 564-65.
31. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
32. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 575-76 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Government regulation of speech that is
fully protected by the first amendment is presumptively invalid and is thus subject to strict
scrutiny. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 602-08 (1978). Exceptions, such
as speech that forms a "clear and present danger," constitute expression regulable as long as
minimal due process requirements are met. Id. Justice Blackmun views the four-part test of
Central Hudson as providing a level of intermediate scrutiny appropriate only for false or
misleading commercial speech, or time, place, and manner restrictions.
34. Id. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's concern is borne out by
the necessity for the Court to issue five decisions just in the narrow area of lawyer advertising
or solicitation since 1977.
35. Id. at 599-600 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19861
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State Bar of Arizona,3 6 the Court considered the claims of two attorneys
who placed a newspaper advertisement that violated a state ban on advertising
legal fees. 37 Faced with disciplinary action, the attorneys appealed to the
state supreme court, which rejected their claim that such a ban violated both
the Sherman Act and the first amendment.38
The United States Supreme Court also rejected the Sherman Act claim,3 9
noting that to do otherwise would have the "undesired effect" of diminution
of the authority of the state to regulate its professions. 40 In addressing the
first amendment claim, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court relied
primarily on Virginia Pharmacy.41 Just as he had failed to find adequate
justification for a ban on advertisements by pharmacists, 42 Justice Blackmun
now found the reasons asserted by the State of Arizona inadequate to support
its ban on price advertising by lawyers.43 Justice Blackmun examined the
adverse effects of such advertisements on the professionalism of attorneys,"
the inherently misleading nature of lawyer advertising,45 the charge that
advertising would increase litigation,46 the possible effects on the cost and
quality of legal services, 47 and the difficulty of enforcing a less than total
ban.48
36. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See generally Meyer & Smith, Attorney Advertising: Bates and
a Beginning, 20 ARIZ L. REV. 427 (1978) (in-depth analysis of Bates with survey of attorneys'
attitudes toward advertising); Welch, Bates, Ohralik, Primus-The First Amendment Challenge
to State Regulation of Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 585 (1979)
(surveying the states' response to Bates); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1,
198 (1977) (somewhat critical of the imprecision of Bates); Comment, Bates and O'Steen v.
State Bar of Arizona: From the Court to the Bar to the Consumer, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 477
(1978) (discussing the ABA response to the question); Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited: The
State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 898 (1977).
37. 433 U.S. at 354-55.
38. Id. at 356. The decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reported as In Re Bates,
113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976).
39. 433 U.S. at 359. The Sherman Act basically prohibits restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982). In rejecting the restraint-of-trade claim, the Court adhered to its decision in
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), which held that the Sherman Act did not prohibit a
state program restricting competition among raisin growers, thus creating a state-action exception
to the Sherman Act. The Bates Court distinguished Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975), which had prohibited enforcement of a minimum-fee schedule by the state bar on
the grounds that such enforcement constituted a classic example of price-fixing. The Court also
distinguished Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (no state-action exception
found where utility's distribution of light bulbs was only indirectly authorized by state regu-
lations).
40. 433 U.S. at 360 n.1l.
41. Id. at 363-65.
42. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
43. 433 U.S. at 379.
44. Id. at 368-72.
45. Id. at 372-75.
46. Id. at 375-77.
47. Id. at 377-79.
48. Id. at 379.
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To the charge of increased litigation, Justice Blackmun replied that much
of the population under-utilized legal services, and that fear of costs was at
least part of the reason for this under-utilization. 49 The Court could not
accept "the notion that it is always better for a person to suffer a wrong
silently than to redress it by legal action." 50 The possibility of increased
costs and decreased quality of services seemed remotely linked to the use of
advertisements.5 As for enforcing less complete bans on solicitation through
advertisements, Justice Blackmun relied on the honesty of the vast majority
of the legal profession, saying that "[ilt is at least somewhat incongruous for
the opponents of advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal
49. Id. at 376. In a footnote, Justice Blackmun indicated that 35.8%0 of the adult
population has never visited an attorney, and another 27.9% has visited an attorney only once.
Id. at 376 n.33. The use of these figures suggests that the Court was relying on two assumptions:
that all adults have legal problems sometime during their lives, and that people with legal
problems should take them to a lawyer. These figures come from preliminary data released by
the ABA Special Committee to Survey Legal Needs. ABA, Legal Services and the Public, 3
ALTERNATIVES 1 (Jan. 1976). This survey, conducted in 1973-1974, was limited to gathering in-
formation about personal (as opposed to business) legal needs and was the first comprehensive
market research regarding the incidence of personal legal problems and the use of lawyers. The
committee itself recognized that it could not draw any hard and fast lines as to which problems
ought to be handled by a lawyer. It also recognized that this often might depend on whether
the person experiencing the problem perceived it as "serious." Id. at 2.
Other figures from the study are revealing. For instance, of thirty-two different legal
problems about which the survey group was questioned, only six had been encountered by
more than 10076 of the respondents. Id. at 4. Fully 95% of those asked were able to give some
source for finding a lawyer. Usually they named a friend, relative, or the telephone book. Id.
at 10.
A great majority (78.9%) felt that a lot of people do not go to lawyers because they have
no way of finding out who is competent to handle their problems. On the other hand, a ma-
jority (58%) also believed that lawyers will only take cases if they believe they know enough to
handle the problem.
To some extent, the actual behavior of the respondents contradicts these attitudes. Only
19.206 of the respondents had ever considered using a lawyer, but then had not. They gave
multiple reasons for this, with the majority (56.3%) being related to the use of an alternate
means for resolving the problem, or feelings that the use of a lawyer was inappropriate or
undesirable. Cost was a reason for only 18.3% of those answering. A mere 3.1% cited
unavailability of a competent lawyer, while 1.2% gave lack of knowledge on their own part as
a reason. Id. at 14.
The survey also tested the attitudes of the population toward lawyers generally. For
example, 42.6% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that other possibilities
should be exhausted before a lawyer is consulted, while 29.3% believed that lawyers work
harder at getting clients than serving them. Id. When asked what qualities they sought in a
lawyer, 16.2% were concerned about the lawyer's ethical standards, while only 8.5% were
worried about fees. Id. at 15. See generally ABA, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
SURVEY LEGAL NEEDS (1978).
50. 433 U.S. at 376. This statement assumes, of course, that "suffering silently" is the
only alternative to legal action. What choice an individual makes when faced with a legal
problem is not germane to the issue of whether an attorney has the right to advertise his
services.
51. Id. at 377.
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profession at one point, and at another, to assert that its members will seize
the opportunity to mislead and distort." 52
Inasmuch as the traditional ban on advertising had originated "as a rule
of etiquette and not as a rule of ethics," 53 Justice Blackmun concluded that
the "historical foundation" for the ban had "crumbled. 5 4 As for the
inherently misleading nature of such advertisements, he stressed that only
routine legal services would lend themselves to the advertisement of fees;
attorneys would not be likely to advertise their many unique services at fixed
prices."
Although the Court in Bates concluded that blanket suppression of lawyer
advertising was insupportable, it reiterated that false, deceptive, or misleading
advertising could be regulated. 6 The Court affirmed the permissibility of
the time, place, and manner restrictions asserted in Virginia Pharmacy.17
Finally, Justice Blackmun noted possible problem areas, including claims
made as to the quality of legal services, in-person solicitation, and advertising
on the electronic broadcast media. The Bates decision, however, decided
only whether lawyers could advertise their fees for routine legal services. 9
In the following term, the Supreme Court issued two decisions on the
same day regarding solicitation by attorneys. In In re Primus,60 an ACLU
attorney had written a letter offering the ACLU's assistance to a woman
who had been sterilized, possibly in violation of her civil rights l.6 The State
52. Id. at 379.
53. 433 U.S. at 371.
54. Id. at 372. Justice Blackmun's primary reason for this conclusion was that the belief
that lawyers are "above" trade is an anachronism. This, of course, does not answer the question
of whether modern concerns have replaced the historical foundation for the advertising ban.
55. Id. Justice Blackmun listed uncontested divorce, simple adoption, uncontested per-
sonal bankruptcy, and change of name as examples of routine legal services.
56. Id. at 383 (citing Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 & n.24). See supra note 2.
57. 433 U.S. at 384. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
58. Id. The Iowa Supreme Court seized upon these very reservations as justification for
Iowa's rules regarding lawyer advertising on the electronic media. Committee on Prof. Ethics
v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 1626 (1986). See
infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
59. On the first amendment issue, Bates was a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice Burger dissented
on the grounds that Virginia Pharmacy had dealt with advertisements of products and not
services. Id. at 386-88 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell,
joined by Justice Stewart, also dissented, stressing the differences between advertising by
pharmacists and by lawyers. Id. at 390-95 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). He concluded that few legal services would fall into the "routine" category outlined by
Justice Blackmun. See supra note 55. Thus, he saw little similarity between legal services and
the standardized products dispensed by pharmacists. Finally, Justice Rehnquist reiterated his
views of the Virginia Pharmacy decision, noting that the "case-by-case adjudication of First
Amendment claims of advertisers was a predictable consequence." Id. at 404-05 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting in part).
60. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). For commentary on Primus, see infra note 68.
61. Id. at 415-16.
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of South Carolina attempted to discipline attorney Primus pursuant to its
ethical canons barring solicitation of clients.62 The Supreme Court reversed,63
noting that restrictions on solicitation were designed to prevent undue influ-
ence or overreaching. The Court found no proof that such undesirable
consequences had occurred.6 It voiced its solicitude for the first amendment
protection accorded to organizations that engage in litigation only as a form
of political expression and association. 65 The state's concerns about "stirring
up" vexatious litigation and minimizing commercialism in the legal profession
did not outweigh the Court's concern for maintaining first amendment
protections. 66 Again, the Court declared that a state may impose time, place,
and manner restrictions on solicitation by members of its bar.6 '
The Court, however, reached the opposite result in the companion case,.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.61 In Ohralik, the Court held that
first amendment concerns were considerably diminished where in-person
solicitation was involved. Ohralik involved an attorney who obtained agree-
ments to represent two young auto-accident victims after having met in
person with each. 69 The Court reaffirmed the state's responsibility for main-
taining standards among the licensed professions.70 Because of the strength
62. Id. at 417-21. The order by which the Supreme Court of South Carolina issued a
public reprimand of attorney Primus is reported at 268 S.C. 259, 233 S.E.2d 301 (1977).
63. 436 U.S. at 421.
64. Id. at 421-22.
65. Id. at 422-25. The Court relied primarily on its decision in NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963). In Button, theSupreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had held that members
and staff attorneys of the NAACP were subject to a state law prohibiting solicitation by
attorneys. NAACP v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960). The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the solicitation of prospective litigants came within the right "to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas." 371 U.S. at 430 (quoting
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). Thus, the activities of the NAACP were
"modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which
Virginia may not prohibit .. .as improper solicitation of legal business . 371 U.S. at
428-29.
66. 436 U.S. at 436-37.
67. Id. at 438 (citing Bates and Virginia Pharmacy). See supra notes 2 & 56.
68. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). For commentary on both Primus and Ohralik, see Ely, The
Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1, 197 (1978) (Ohralik too neatly divided
solicitation into the giving of legal advice and the proposal of a business relationship); Pulaski,
In-Person Solicitation and First Amendment: Was Ohralik Wrongly Decided?, 1979 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 23 (nonpecuniary solicitation should be protected regardless of subjective motive);
Note, Constitutional Law-Attorney Advertising and Solicitation-In the Wake of Bates, 10
TEX. TECH L. REV. 166 (1978) (only false or misleading solicitation should be banned); Note,
Constitutional Law-Attorney Solicitation Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 53
TUL L. REV. 617 (1979) (narrowly drawn rules to proscribe solicitation could be uniformly
applied without discriminating on basis of motivation); Comment, Attorney Solicitation: The
Scope of State Regulation After Primus and Ohralik, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 144 (1978) (com-
mercial/noncommercial distinction should not be basis for solicitation laws).
69. 436 U.S. at 449-51.
70. Id. at 460. "[T]he State bears a special responsibility for maintaining standards
among members of the licensed professions." Id.
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of the state's concerns and the difficulty in regulating members of the bar
the Court held that a prophylactic rule against in-person solicitation was not
violate of Constitution.' Two years later, the Court again struck down a
state rule regulating attorney advertising. In In re R.M.J.,7 an attorney
placed an advertisement that did not adhere to the rules of the Missouri
Supreme Court.'" Although Missouri's rules had been amended in
the aftermath of the Bates decision,'7 4 they still restricted the areas of practice
lawyers' advertisements could specify7 and did not permit an attorney to
list the jurisdictions in which he had been admitted to practice. 76 In addition,
the attorney had sent announcement cards to persons other than to those
permitted under the rules.
77
In re R.M.J. presented the Court with its first opportunity to apply the
four-part test of Central Hudson to a state regulation of lawyer advertising.
In so doing, the Court found that the type of information actually included
71. Id. at 467.
72. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). See generally Whitman & Stoltenberg, The Present Constitutional
Status of Lawyer Advertising- Theoretical and Practical Implications of In Re R.M.J., 57 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 445, 475 n.165 (1983) (noting that only 100'o of lawyers in one poll actually
advertised); Comment, The First Amendment, In Re R.M.J. and State Regulation of Direct
Mail Lawyer Advertising, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 411 (1982) (extensive review of state decisions
regarding mail advertisements); Note, In Re R.M.J.: Reassessing the Extension of First Amend-
ment Protection to Attorney Advertising, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 229 (1983) (flow of needed
legal information will be constrained by allowing states greater freedom to regulate lawyer
advertising).
73. 455 U.S. at 196-98.
74. Id. at 193. The Committee on Professional Ethics and Responsibility of the Supreme
Court of Missouri sought to "strike a midpoint between prohibition and unlimited advertising."
Report of Committee to Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Missouri (Sept. 9, 1977).
75. The relevant part of an addendum to Rule 4 of the Supreme Court of Missouri
provided:
[A] lawyer or law firm can use one or more of the following:
I. "Administrative Law"
2. "Anti-Trust Law"
18. "Property Law"
21. "Tort Law"
No deviation from the above phraseology will be permitted and no statement of
limitation of practice can be stated ....
Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 4, Addendum II (Adv. Comm. Nov. 13, 1977).
76. The Rule permitted only ten categories of information: name, address and telephone
number; areas of practice; date and place of birth; schools attended; foreign language ability;
office hours; fee for an initial consultation; availability of a schedule of fees; credit arrange-
ments; and the fixed fee to be charged for certain specified routine legal services. Mo. Sup.
Ct. R. 4, DR 2-101(B) (Index Vol.) (1978). Missouri's current rule on lawyer advertising appears
as Supreme Court R.4, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 7.1 & 7.2 (effective Jan. 1,
1986).
77. 455 U.S. at 198.
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in the advertisements was not in itself misleading. For instance, the attorney
had used the word "real estate" instead of the required word "property. 7 8
Nor did the Court find the identification of jurisdictions in which the
advertiser was licensed to practice misleading. 79 The Court then turned to
the question of whether the state regulations were broader than reasonably
necessary to prevent deception. It found that the state had established no
interest compelling the restrictions on the types of information that could
be included in the advertisements, the way in which areas of practice could
be described, or the groups of people to whom announcements could be
sent. 0 Justice Powell's opinion did note, however, that the states "retain
the authority to regulate advertising that is inherently misleading or that has
proved to be misleading in practice.""
The Note will now examine the breadth of authority to regulate attorney
advertising that remains after Zauderer.
II. THE ZAUDERER DECISION
Late in 1981, attorney Philip Q. Zauderer advertised in a newspaper that
he would represent defendants in drunken driving cases, and that he would
refund their attorney's fees if they were convicted of drunk driving. 82 The
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio contacted
Zauderer and warned him that his advertisement appeared to be an offer to
represent criminal defendants on a contingent-fee basis in violation of the
Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility. Zauderer immediately withdrew
the advertisement and promised not to accept employment by anyone re-
sponding to it. 3
In 1982, Zauderer placed an advertisement in thirty-six Ohio newspapers
in which he offered to represent women who had suffered injuries as a result
of using the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device (IUD). The advertisement
included a drawing of a Dalkon Shield and advised readers not to assume
that it was too late to take action against the manufacturer of the device.8 4
78. Id. at 205.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 205-06.
81. Id. at 207.
82. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2271 (1985).
83. Id.
84. Id. The question, "DID YOU USE THIS IUD?" accompanied the drawing. The
advertisement then read as follows:
The Dalkon Shield Interuterine [sic] Device is alleged to have caused serious
pelvic infections resulting in hospitalizations, tubal damage, infertility, and hyster-
ectomies. It is also alleged to have caused unplanned pregnancies ending in abortions,
miscarriages, septic abortions, tubal or ectopic pregnancies, and full-term deliveries.
If you or a friend have had a similar experience do not assume it is too late to
take legal action against the Shield's manufacturer. Our law firm is presently
representing women on such cases. The cases are handled on a contingent fee basis
1986]
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Zauderer received over 200 inquiries and initiated lawsuits on behalf of 106
of the women that contacted him as a result of the advertisement."' The
Office of Disciplinary Counsel responded to the advertisement with charges
that Zauderer had violated the following Disciplinary Rules: DR 2-101(B),
which prohibited the use of most illustrations8 6 and limited the types of
information that may be included in an advertisement; DR 2-103(A), which
prohibited attorneys from recommending employment of themselves to lay
persons who had not sought their advice; 7 and DR 2-104(A), which prohib-
ited attorneys from accepting employment from anyone to whom they had
given unsolicited advice.88 The complaint against Zauderer also alleged that
his earlier drunken driving advertisement was deceptive because it offered
representation on a contingent-fee basis in a criminal case. 89
of the amount recovered. If there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed by our
clients.
Id. at 2271-72.
85. Id. at 2272.
86. Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) provided in pertinent part:
In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential
consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to DR 2-
103, in print media or over radio or television. Print media includes only regularly
published newspapers, magazines and other periodicals, classified telephone direc-
tories, city, county and suburban directories, law directories and law lists. The
information disclosed by the lawyer in such a publication or broadcast shall comply
with DR 2-101(A) and be presented in a dignified manner without the use of
drawings, illustrations, animations, portrayals, dramatizations, slogans, music, lyrics
or the use of pictures, except for the use of pictures of the advertising lawyer, or
the use of a portrayal of the scales of justice. Only the following information may
be published or broadcast:
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of . . . professional associates,
addresses and telephone numbers;
(13) Fee for an initial consultation;
(14) Availability upon request of a written . . . schedule of fees or an estimate of
the fee to be charged for specific services;
(15) Contingent' fee rates subject to DR 2-106(C), provided that the statement
discloses whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of court costs
and expenses; ....
OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1981). Ohio's Code has since been
amended and reads simply:
In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential
consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to DR 2-
102 through 2-105, information in print media, in written or printed material
distributed to consumers through the mail or otherwise; or over radio or television.
The information disclosed by the lawyer in such publication or broadcast shall
comply with DR 2-101(A).
OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1985) (effective March 1, 1986).
87. Id. DR 2-103(A) (1981).
88. Id. DR 2-104(A) (1981).
89. 105 S. Ct. at 2272.
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A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of
the Supreme Court of Ohio found that Zauderer had violated the Disciplinary
Rules, but for slightly different reasons than those advanced by the Office
of Disciplinary Counsel. 9° For example, the panel found the drunken driving
advertisement deceptive because it failed to mention the practice of plea
bargaining. Thus, despite the promise in the advertisement, defendants who
pleaded guilty to a lesser offense would still be liable for attorney's fees
even though they had not been convicted of drunken driving per se. 91 The
panel also found that the Dalkon Shield advertisement failed to disclose the
client's potential liability for the costs of an unsuccessful suit. 92
The panel noted that neither Bates nor In re R.M.J. had forbidden al
regulation of advertising by attorneys. 93 It also relied heavily on Ohralik for
the proposition that the interests served in regulating advertisements that
contained legal advice and solicited clients were as substantial as the interests
served by a ban on in-person solicitation. 94 The Supreme Court of Ohio
adopted the panel's findings and concluded that Zauderer's conduct war-
ranted a public reprimand. 95
Zauderer appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In an opinion
written by Justice White, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. 96
Justice White first reiterated the tenets of the Court's earlier decisions
regarding commercial speech and lawyer advertising. 9 He then divided the
Ohio regulations into three types: those prohibiting the use of specific legal
advice in advertisements; those restricting the use of illustrations; and those
stating disclosure requirements relating to the terms of contingent fees. 9
After concluding that Zauderer's statements regarding the Dalkon Shield
were not false or deceptive, 99 the Court considered the possible state interests
that might justify a total ban on advertisements containing legal advice.
First, the Court compared print advertising with in-person solicitation, and
concluded that the substantial interests that justified the ban on in-person
solicitation in Ohralik could not justify the discipline imposed on Zauderer
for his advertisement. °0 Although in-person solicitation is a practice "rife
with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue
90. Id. at 2273-74.
91. Id. at 2273.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2274.
94. Id.
95. Id. This decision is reported as Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio
St. 3d 44, 461 N.E.2d 883 (1984).
96. 105 S. Ct. at 2274.
97. Id. at 2274-75.
98. Id. at 2275.
99. Id. at 2277.
100. Id.
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influence, and outright fraud,"'' ° the same is not true of print advertising.
The latter, he noted, lacks the "coercive force of the personal presence of
a trained advocate.' 0 2
Second, Justice White addressed the fear that solicitation, even in the
printed media, would "stir up litigation." He reiterated the observation in
Bates that the Supreme Court could not accept the notion that it is better
"to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal means."' 13 In a
footnote, he suggested that "if the State's concern is with abuse of process,
it can best achieve its aim by enforcing sanctions against vexatious litiga-
tion."' 1° Finally, Justice White failed to find justification for a prophylactic
ban on the use of legal advice in advertisements simply because of the
difficulties posed by attempts to enforce a less restrictive rule. Inasmuch as
"assessment of the validity of legal advice and information contained in
attorneys' advertising is not necessarily a matter of great complexity," the
state had failed to show a need for such prophylactic measures. 05
Similarly, the state's restrictions on the use of illustrations failed to
withstand the Court's scrutiny. Just as the legal advice was not false or
deceptive, the Court found that the drawing of the Dalkon Shield was not
inaccurate. 1°6 The asserted state interests in maintaining "dignity" in attor-
neys' advertisements and in avoiding enforcement problems were found
insufficient to justify the limitations imposed by DR 2-101(B). 0 7 Although
recognizing the difficulties of policing the visual content of advertisements,
White noted that the Federal Trade Commission, in other areas, had not
found the task impossible. 08
Finally, the Court, in addressing the issue of disclosure requirements,
recognized the significant differences between disclosure requirements and
blanket prohibitions on speech.'09 Recalling that the Court's decision in
Virginia Pharmacy had rested in large part on the value to the reader of the
information contained in an advertisement," 0 the Court found that the state
could reasonably require warnings or disclaimers to prevent confusion or
deception."' Zauderer's advertisements had failed to distinguish between
101. Id. See also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466 (in-person solicitation, unlike printed advertising,
is not open to public scrutiny).
102. 105 S. Ct. at 2277.
103. Id. at 2278 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 376). See supra note 50.
104. 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2279 n.12.
105. Id. at 2279.
106. Id. at 2280.
107. Id. at 2280-81.
108. Id. at 2281.
109. Id. "The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information regarding
his services is not ... a fundamental right." Id. at 2282 n.14.
110. Id. at 2282. See also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764 (noting "society's strong
interest in the free flow of commercial information").
111. Id. at 2282 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982)). See also Central Hudson, 447
[Vol. 36:133
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"legal fees" and "costs" and, because such terms are interchangeable in the
mind of a nonlawyer, the possibility of deception was substantial.1 1 2 The
Court concluded that the reprimands of Zauderer for the use of an illustration
and legal advice in his advertisements could not stand. The Court affirmed
the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court, however, to the extent that it was
based on omission of information regarding contingent-fee arrangements. 13
III. ANALYSIS
The Zauderer case demonstrates the Supreme Court's failure to provide
guidance to the states for regulating solicitation by lawyers without sup-
pressing protected speech. Because the Court in Bates commanded state bar
associations to relax restrictions on attorney advertising, most states complied
by rewriting their rules regarding advertising. 1 14 But as the decisions in In re
R.M.J. and Zauderer demonstrate, relaxation of the rules was not enough.
Despite repeated pronouncements regarding reasonable restrictions and sub-
stantial state interests," 5 Zauderer indicates that only the Supreme Court can
determine what is "reasonable" and "substantial." The Bates decision
permitted only advertising of fees for "routine legal services.""l 6 In In re
R.M.J., the Court affirmed that Bates was a narrow ruling that did not
U.S. at 565 (requiring disclosures in advertisements less restrictive than outright ban); Bates,
433 U.S. at 384 (anticipating that warnings or disclaimers might be required in lawyer adver-
tising); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (lesser toleration of inaccurate statements
in commercial speech may require warnings or disclaimers to prevent deception).
112. 105 S. Ct. at 2283. "The assumption that substantial numbers of potential clients
could be . . .misled is hardly a speculative one .... When the possibility of deception is as
self-evident as it is in this case, we need not require the State to 'conduct a survey of the...
public ... Id. (citing FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965)) (emphasis
added).
113. 105 S. Ct. at 2284.
114. The ABA, for instance, amended its Model Code DR 2-101 in 1977 to allow
publication of information in print media or broadcast over television or radio, but continued
to limit the types of information to twenty-five specified categories. By 1980, a majority of
states had followed suit. A few permitted advertising in the print media while continuing to
ban advertisements in the electronic media. Perhaps the most elegant of the new rules was that
of Massachusetts: "A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, knowingly use or participate in the use of any
form of public communication containing a deceptive statement or claim." MASSACHUSETTS
CANONS OF ETHICS AND DISCIPLINARY RULES REGULATING THE PRACTICE OF LAW DR 2-101 (1986).
115. "[T]here may be reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of adver-
tising." Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (cited in In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 n.13). "We have
often approved [time, place, and manner restrictions] provided that they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech . Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
116. 433 U.S. at 372. "The only services that lend themselves to advertising are the routine
ones: the uncontested divorce, the simple adoption, the uncontested personal bankruptcy, the
change of name, and the like .... I Id.
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abolish all state regulation of advertisements.' 1 7 A product liability suit
against a major corporation, such as Zauderer's advertisement proposed, is
hardly a "routine legal service." Nor is it a service for which a prospective
plaintiff is likely to go comparison shopping. Nevertheless, concern over
middle class consumers' access to affordable legal services formed the basis
of the Bates decision to relax the strictures against lawyer advertisements.
Furthermore, the Bates Court noted that the bar associations retain the
power to define the services included in an advertised package."' The Court
could hardly have been suggesting that such a service as Mr. Zauderer
offered was either routine or easily defined.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the potential for de-
ception in advertisements of professional services is great." 9 To illustrate,
suppose a physician were to place the following advertisement in the print
media:
Automobile accidents have reportedly caused serious injuries such as com-
minuted fractures, splenic ruptures, and intracranial injuries. They have
also reportedly led to complications such as fat emboli, internal hemor-
rhage, and neurovascular deficits. If you or a friend have had a similar
experience do not assume that your injuries are irreversible. My office is
currently treating patients with such problems. The cases are handled for
fees that are commensurate with those charged by other physicians.2o
While none of the statements made are false on their face, such an
advertisement says nothing about the doctor's qualifications, the results he
has achieved in his treatments, or the amount of his fee. It does not,
therefore, benefit the consumer. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court would give
full first amendment protection to such an advertisement unless some sub-
stantial state interest intervened. 2' This is apparently so even if the advertiser,
making use of a similar list of medical terms and offering no promises, is
a lawyer with no medical training. The potential for misleading the public,
which the Supreme Court admits is inherent in professional advertising, is
117. 455 U.S. at 200.
118. 433 U.S. 350, 373 n.28.
119. "[Biecause the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements
that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite
inappropriate in legal advertising." Bates, 433 U.S. at 383. The opinion then points out in a
footnote that, after consideration of the legal sophistication of an advertisement's audience,
"different degrees of regulation may be appropriate in different areas." Id. at 383 n.37.
"[Tihe potential for deception and confusion is particulary strong in the context of advertis-
ing professional services." In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. See also supra note 21.
120. This hypothetical ad tracks Zauderer's own advertisement in word-for-word fashion.
Cf. supra note 84.
121. Where an advertisement is not false or deceptive, the Court's decisions "impose on
the State the burden of establishing that prohibiting the use of such statements to solicit or
obtain legal business directly advances a substantial government interest." Zauderer, 105 S. Ct.
at 2277.
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multiplied when information from two specialized areas is combined in one
advertisement.
In Zauderer, the Court noted that the parties had stipulated that Zauderer's
Dalkon Shield advertisement was not false, misleading or deceptive .
22 It
then uncritically accepted that stipulation. The Bates Court had cautioned
that to determine whether an advertisement is misleading requires consider-
ation of the legal sophistication of its audience.123 It follows that whether a
lawyer's advertisement containing a list of medical terms is misleading might
depend on the medical sophistication of the audience as well. The Zauderer
Court glossed over the fact that a reader of Mr. Zauderer's advertisement
might well be confused as to the difference between an abortion, a septic
abortion, and a miscarriage. The Court also ignored the suggestion in the
advertisement that the device can "cause" a pregnancy. It might not be
clear to the average reader whether the advertisement used the word "cause"
in a legal or physiological sense. The incidence of ill effects due to the use
of IUD's has obviously been of great interest to the public.'l But the Court
did not consider whether discussion of a matter of public concern as a
vehicle for the sale of legal services imparted any greater importance to the
representations, or lack thereof, made as to the legal services themselves.
25
Instead, the Court blandly noted that Zauderer's advertisement merely re-
ported the "indisputable fact" that the Dalkon Shield had spawned an
impressive number of lawsuits and advised readers that Mr. Zauderer was
currently handling such lawsuits.
Although the decision in In re R.M.J. overturned certain state rules, the
Court was careful to point out that the states retained the authority to
regulate advertising "that has proved to be misleading in practice.' ' 26 In
122. Id. at 2276.
123. See supra note 119.
124. As the Zauderer Court itself noted, by the end of 1984 over 9800 claims had been
brought against A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield. 105 S. Ct. at 2276 n.10.
125. The Ninth Circuit, for example, while recognizing that the first amendment protection
of commercial speech prohibits the stifling of comment on a subject of public interest even
when presented in an advertising format, nevertheless concluded that "when discussion of a
matter of public concern becomes a vehicle for sale of a product, the representations which
bear on the characteristics of the product may take on increased importance in the mind of
the public, and it is appropriate for the [Federal Trade] Commission to consider this factor in
determining whether the advertising is misleading or deceptive." Standard Oil of Cal. v. FTC,
577 F.2d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 1978). See also FTC v. Pharmtech Research, Inc., 576 F. Supp.
294, 297 (D.D.C. 1983) (fear of cancer as a vehicle for sale of product).
126. 455 U.S. at 207. The Court, however, offered no examples. Note that in advertising
that is subject to regulation by the FTC, "the Commission may determine for itself [the
deceptive nature of the representations] through visual inspection and analysis." United States
Retail Credit Ass'n v. FTC, 300 F.2d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 1962). In making this determination
the Commission is entitled to "draw upon its own experience in order to determine [even] in
the absence of consumer testimony, the natural and probable result of the use of advertising
expressions." Carter Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 495 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 884 (1959) (parenthetical in original).
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Zauderer, however, the Court failed to address the question of whether the
advertisement was "misleading in practice." Mr. Zauderer produced two
women to testify at his hearing that they would never have learned of their
legal claims had it not been for his advertisement. 127 A survey of all the
women who responded to the advertisement would have been more to the
point. The fact that Zauderer accepted only 106 clients from "well over"
200 women who made inquiries 12 might well suggest that the others had not
simply called Mr. Zauderer by mistake. But the Court dismissed the idea
that anything about Mr. Zauderer's advertisement led those women to the
mistaken belief that they might have a claim against the manufacturer. After
Zauderer, it is questionable whether the states will ever be able to meet the
burden of proving deception.
Not having examined Zauderer's advertisement for either inherently mis-
leading qualities or for a misleading effect upon the public, the Supreme
Court easily dismissed as unnecessary Ohio's prophylactic rule against ad-
vertisements containing legal advice. The Court reasoned that it was possi-
ble to present such information in a truthful, nondeceptive manner. The
Court's primary reason for dismissing Ohio's ban on legal advice was that
printed advertisements do not possess the same potential for overreaching
and invasion of privacy as does in-person solicitation."29 Thus, it was the
"unique features" of in-person solicitation that in Ohralik had justified
Ohio's similarly prophylactic rule against such activity. The Court's new
rule is that state regulations of commercial speech are permissible only if
the proscribed activity has some uniquely compelling characteristic that
renders unenforceable any less restrictive regulation than an across-the-
board ban on such activity. In support of its conclusion, the Court relied
on dictum from In re R.M.J.: "[T]he States may not place an absolute
prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information ... if the
information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive."' 30 Because
the Court failed to find anything misleading about Zauderer's advertisement,
it simply concluded that statements about law can be presented in a non-
deceptive manner. A state should have no more difficulty in distinguishing
deceptive and nondeceptive legal advertising than does, for example, the
Federal Trade Commission in its regulation of other types of advertise-
ments.'3' The Court thus left open the question of whether prophylactic rules
127. 105 S. Ct. at 2273.
128. Id. at 2272.
129. Id. at 2277.
130. 455 U.S. at 203.
131. 105 S. Ct. at 2279. The Court cited Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1977), and National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977),
for the proposition that distinguishing deceptive from nondeceptive advertising may well require
resolution of exceedingly complex and technical factual issues. Therefore, the Court argues,
since the FTC manages to do it in other areas, the states will be able to distinguish valid legal
advice from deceptive information. The Warner-Lambert court, however, noted the limited role
[Vol. 36:133
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are ever permissible in this area. Since it is hard to imagine an advertising
activity that possesses all the undesirable characteristics of in-person solici-
tation, the clear implication is that the Court believes that prophylactic bans
are unacceptable except for the specific activity that Ohralik decried.
The Court also failed to address the question of what time, place, or
manner restrictions are permissible. Although it has affirmed and reaffirmed
the permissibility of such restrictions, 3 2 Zauderer teaches that such restric-
tions, or at least restrictions on the use of illustrations, must pass the four-
part test of Central Hudson. Since the Court equated the pictorial content
of an advertisement with its verbal content, for first amendment purposes,
the result is the same-the state may not ban all illustrations in lawyers'
advertisements since such illustrations can be accurate representations. Sig-
nificantly, the Court examined only whether Zauderer's drawing was an
accurate depiction of a Dalkon Shield. Once again, the Court failed to
consider whether such a drawing, accurate though it might have been on its
face, could have been misleading in practice. There are probably few IUD
users who would know for certain whether such a drawing represents the
particular device they use. Nevertheless, the Zauderer Court extended the
protections of Central Hudson to such illustrations. The Court simply relied
on the state's ability to police the visual content of advertisements, notwith-
standing the admitted complexity of the task.'33
In discussing the constitutionality of disclosure requirements, the Zauderer
Court suddenly back-pedaled on the subject of what constitutes a misleading
of the courts in reviewing decisions of the FTC:
The Supreme Court has set forth the standard:
The Commission is the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to
eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It has
wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere except where the remedy
selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist.
562 F.2d at 762 (quoting Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946)) (emphasis
added). The Court has thus created different levels of review for advertising that falls within
the jurisdiction of the FTC as opposed to lawyer advertising reviewable only by the state courts.
Perhaps the Court is suggesting that the states establish independent agencies to review lawyer
advertising and simply advert to the judgment of such agencies. See also infra note 133.
132. See supra note 119.
133. 105 S. Ct. at 2281. "Although the [FTC] has not found the elimination of deceptive
uses of visual media in advertising to be a simple task, neither has it found the task an
impossible one." Id. (citing FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965)). Note, however,
that in Colgate-Palmolive, the Court discussed the broad powers of the FTC to enforce the
mandate of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 52 Stat. 111
(1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982)). The 1938 amendments gave the Com-
mission jurisdiction over "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." Id. The Colgate-
Palmolive Court noted the importance of the generality of these standards of illegality and
pointed out that it had "frequently stated that the Commission's judgment is to be given great
weight by reviewing courts. This admonition is especially true with respect to allegedly deceptive
advertising since the finding of a . . . violation in this field rests so heavily on inference and
pragmatic judgment." 380 U.S. at 384-85 (citations omitted).
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advertisement. Because Zauderer's advertisement failed to disclose that a
client might be liable for "costs" in an unsuccessful suit, it did not meet
the requirements of Ohio DR 2-101(B)(15).' a4 Here the Court found that
there are technical meanings to the terms "fees" and "costs," such that the
possibility of deception becomes "self-evident. ' '1 3 Thus, a state may mandate
disclosure requirements regarding such technical terms at its own behest,
with no need to make a prior determination of whether such terms are
actually misleading to the public. 36 Why the possibility of deception is self-
evident in an advertisement for fees or costs, but not in advertising with
fairly specialized medical language, is not clear from the Court's opinion.
The Court permits a state to impose a disclosure requirement for fees or
costs without any inquiry into the actual potential for deception. At the
same time, it denies the states the power to impose a prophylactic ban on
information such as pictorial devices, for which the potential for deception
is known and is regularly encountered in other forms of advertising.
IV. IMPACT
Zauderer blurs the distinctions between commercial speech and more fully
protected noncommercial speech. The Court has implicitly adopted Justice
Marshall's view, in his concurrences in Primus and Ohralik, that advertising
by lawyers is simply "benign" commercial solicitation. 37 By limiting regu-
lation to commercial speech that is actually false, misleading or deceptive,
the Court has virtually extended full first amendment protection to adver-
tising. This is odd because the Court has declined to give such protection
even to political speech. In the area of political speech, time, place, and
manner restrictions- may be applied in the service of a variety of state
interests.' The Court has even countenanced outright bans on certain types
134. See supra note 86.
135. 105 S. Ct. at 2283. See also supra note 112.
136. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
137. "By 'benign' commercial solicitation, I mean solicitation by advice and information
that is truthful and that is presented in a non-coercive, non-deceitful, and dignified manner to
a potential client who is emotionally and physically capable of making a rational decision either
to accept or reject the representation with respect to a legal claim or matter that is not
frivolous." Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
138. The Court has countenanced such governmental interests as preserving the appearance
of political neutrality in the military, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976); avoiding the
appearance of political favoritism in a city's allotment of advertising space on its buses, Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974); preserving the appearance that government
employees are politically impartial in the execution of their duties, United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973); the operation of
schools, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119-20 (1972); the functioning of the
military draft, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 378-80 (1968); and preserving the
appearance of judicial independence, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965).
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of inherently false political speech.3 9 In other areas, the Court has recognized
various state interests permitting regulation of speech. But in the area of
lawyer advertising, the Court has rejected one asserted state interest after
another as too insubstantial to justify controls. To this extent, lawyer
advertising receives greater protection than some types of political speech.
Zauderer also "constitutionalizes" ethical rules of the legal profession. 4 °
The Court has transformed the first amendment into an all-encompassing
rule that safeguards not only our political freedom, but also consumers'
access to prescription drug prices, public utilities' ability to promote the use
of their services, and "benign" commercial solicitation by attorneys. This
has been a neat historical trick. The first amendment on its face addressed
only congressional actions. 141 The United States Supreme Court did not even
begin to seriously consider the full extent of constitutional protection for
political speech until after World War I. 142 Thereafter, it made the protections
of the first amendment applicable to the states in piecemeal fashion. 143 State
regulation of pure commercial speech did not fall under the purview of the
first amendment until the Court's decision in Virginia Pharmacy in 1976.
Now, because the practice of law is at bottom a commercial activity,144 even
those rules formulated to govern the ethical conduct of the profession must
139. The most notable example is Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), which
sustained an Illinois prohibition against group libel, even though the law was content-specific.
Although Beauharnais has been questioned by the lower federal courts as no longer controlling,
see, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), it has never been overruled. Smith v.
Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from a denial of a stay of the court of
appeals order).
140. Cf. Boden, Five Years after Bates: Lawyer Advertising in Legal and Ethical Per-
spective, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 547 (1982). Boden suggests that the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility merely embodied rules of professional conduct and not ethical principles. Thus,
the ethical principle "Thou shalt bear no false witness" survived the constitutionalization of
the rules regarding lawyer advertising. Id. For a more pragmatic view of what constitutes ethical
principles, compare Justice Holmes: "What is generally called the 'ethics' of the profession is
but the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity of such standards." Semler v. Oregon
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1941).
141. The first amendment, in pertinent part, reads: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
142. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919). See generally L. TRIBE,
supra note 33, § 12-9, at 608-17 (discussing the "clear and present danger" exception to first
amendment protection of political speech).
143. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (nonestablishment of
religion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise of religion); Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (petition); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (assembly);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927) (incorporating freedom of speech into the fourteenth amendment).
144. Cf. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-72. "Since the belief that lawyers are somehow 'above'
trade has become an anachronism, the historical foundation for the advertising restraint has
crumbled." Id. at 371-72. This statement of course begs the question whether modern-day
concerns, such as the increased litigiousness of our society and the clogging of our court systems,
have not replaced that "historical foundation."
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pass constitutional muster. The Court nowhere considers how many steps
removed this modern application of the first amendment is from that amend-
ment's original purposes.' 5 Instead, the Court has been all too willing to
set itself up as the final arbiter of all regulations of commercial advertising,
including those rules directed solely at a professional group, simply because
some form of expression is involved.
The Court demonstrated in Zauderer that the deference that it has ex-
pressed toward the ability of the states to regulate commercial speech has
been a false one, borne of the secret knowledge that in the end only the
Supreme Court knows what regulation is permissible in this area. Gone is
any appreciation for Justice Powell's dissent in Bates, that one of the virtues
of federalism is that it permits the states to experiment in defining what the
permissible limits on lawyer advertising should be.'" Apparently the con-
straints of stare decisis limited the Court in Bates and In re R.M.J. to strike
only the specific rules that banned certain forms of advertising. Now Zau-
derer expansively implies that no such rules are permissible except those
banning in-person solicitation. Rather, the states must assess all activities
involving solicitation of clients in terms of whether the activity is inherently
false or misleading, or has proven to be so in practice. But Zauderer also
demonstrates that the Court has its own opinion of what is inherently
misleading. The final result is a rule that the Court could just as easily have
announced in Bates, but which is no more easily applied by the states despite
the attempts of the Court in Zauderer to give it more definition. A state,
for example, can no longer be certain whether a ban on claims of speciali-
zation in a given field of the law is permissible on grounds that such claims
are inherently misleading. May an attorney permitted to advertise himself in
one state as a patent attorney, similarly advertise himself in another state
that has not recognized that specialty? Is a statement in an advertisement
that a lawyer is a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United
States misleading or merely in bad taste? The Court left open this question
in In re R.M.J. because the Missouri Supreme Court had made no finding
that a similar statement was in fact misleading to the general public. 47 While
the Supreme Court obviously believed that such a statement could be mis-
145. See, e.g., Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the
First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979), in which the authors assert that the first amendment
protects only certain identifiable values, chiefly effective self-government and individual self-
fulfillment through free expression. They argue that protection of commercial speech is not
essential for the furtherance of either of these values. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 12-1, at
576-79 (rejecting such narrow bases for the scope of first amendment protections).
146. 433 U.S. at 403 (Powell, J., dissenting). "The constitutionalizing-indeed the affirm-
ative encouraging-of competitive price advertising of specified legal services will substantially
inhibit the experimentation that has been underway and also will limit the control heretofore
exercised over lawyers by the respective States." Id.
147. 455 U.S. at 205.
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leading, 14s the Zauderer Court now suggests that the statement, if true on
its face, is not inherently misleading and is protected unless a state demon-
strates that it is actually misleading in practice.
It is apparent that the state courts may not reach results of which the
Supreme Court would approve, given the vagueness of Zauderer's guidelines
for separating that which is inherently misleading from that which is only
potentially misleading but accurate on its face, and the problems inherent
in defining the reasonableness of a state regulation. One court has already
balked at applying the rules of Zauderer and Central Hudson in the area of
television advertising by attorneys. Relying on dictum from Bates that ac-
knowledged special problems in the area of electronic broadcasting, the Iowa
Supreme Court in Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey49 has
interpreted Zauderer narrowly. The Iowa court noted that Zauderer dealt
solely with a printed advertisement.' 50 The court then decided that television
advertising was closer to in-person solicitation than it was to print adver-
tising." 1 It avoided applying all four parts of the test of Central Hudson
because the state's interest in regulating lawyer advertising in the electronic
media was so substantial as to justify close regulation of such advertise-
ments.3 2 Despite the fact that the controversy in Zauderer centered on a
printed advertisement, the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine has
wider application than the printed media alone. The Iowa court's virtual
rejection of Zauderer was probably not what the Supreme Court expected
when it remanded Humphrey for further consideration in light of Zauderer.
148. "Somewhat more troubling is appellant's listing, in large capital letters, that he was
a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States. The emphasis of this relatively
uninformative fact is at least bad taste. Indeed, such a statement could be misleading to the
general public unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to the Bar of this Court." Id.
(citation omitted).
149. 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa 1985), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, 106 S. Ct. 1626 (1986). The Iowa Supreme Court's original decision appeared as
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984). The defendants
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the
case for further consideration in light of Zauderer. 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985).
150. 377 N.W.2d at 646.
151. Id. "Electronic media advertising, when contrasted with printed advertising, tolerates
much less deliberation by those at whom it is aimed. Both sight and sound are immediate and
can be elusive because, for the listener or viewer at least, in a flash they are gone without a
trace. Lost is the opportunity accorded to the reader of printed advertisements to pause, to
restudy, and to thoughtfully consider." Id. (footnote omitted).
152. Id. at 647. Iowa's rule permits use of nineteen items of information in advertisements.
With regard to television advertising the rule provides:
The same information, in words and numbers only, articulated by a single non-
dramatic voice, not that of the lawyer, and with no other background sound, may
be communicated by radio or television. In the case of television, no visual display
shall be allowed except that allowed in print as articulated by the announcer.
IOWA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS DR 2-101(B) (1985)
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Humphrey demonstrates continued resistance to the Supreme Court's strin-
gent protection of commercial speech.
The Zauderer decision does, however, permit disclosure requirements.'
States are presumably free to reformulate their rules on advertising in terms
of what additional information must be included to dissipate the possibility
of confusion or deception. Such rules could conceivably be quite detailed as
to what they might require. Zauderer does place a limit on such disclosures.
The limit, however, is stated in terms no more certain than the rule allowing
regulation only if "reasonably" necessary to advance "substantial" state
interests. Disclosure requirements that are "unjustified or unduly burden-
some . . . might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commer-
cial speech."' 5 4 This is a new degree of solicitousness for the concerns of
commercial advertisers. In a world rife with advertising, the Supreme Court
of the United States is concerned that the ethical rules of officers of the
court who are sworn to uphold the Constitution, and who formulated such
rules only to govern themselves, may unduly "chill" commercial speech.
This is symptomatic of the cavalier attitude the Court has towards the
problems faced by state bar associations in the enforcement of their rules.,
Despite the misgivings on the part of at least some members of the Court
as to the general level of competence among attorneys,' 6 and despite wide-
spread suspicion on the part of the public as to the level of professionalism
153. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
154. 105 S. Ct. at 2282.
155. See, e.g., Bates: "It is at least somewhat incongruous for the opponents of advertising
to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal profession at one point, and, at another, to assert
that its members will seize the opportunity to mislead and distort." 433 U.S. at 379. See also
supra notes 105 & 108 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, the Court has recognized "the difficulties and complexities-and
the inadequacy-of disciplinary enforcement." Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466 n.28. See generally
ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (Preliminary Draft 1970).
Cf. Humphrey: "[The] courts ... have not been supplied with sufficient resources to expand
their regulatory responsibility in order to police even the ingenious activity of the minority of
lawyers who have utilizid print advertisements to promote dishonest scams." 377 N.W.2d at
649 (Reynoldson, J., concurring).
156. See, e.g., the views of Chief Justice Burger in Burger, Conference on Supreme Court
Advocacy, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 525 (1984) (calling for greater preparation by attorneys for
arguments before the Supreme Court); Burger, The Role of Law School in the Teaching of
Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377 (1980) (noting client
complaints regarding attorneys' competency); and Burger, Some Further Reflections on the
Problem of Adequacy of Trial Counsel, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1980). See also Justice
O'Connor's views in O'Conner, Legal Education and Social Responsibility, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 659, 661 (1985) ("Too many lawyers are insensitive to their greater ethical and social
responsibilities. ... ); and O'Connor, Professional Competence and Social Responsibility:
Fulfilling the Vanderbilt Vision, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1983) (noting the increase in disciplinary
actions against attorneys). See also Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy: A Disappearing Art, 35
MERCER L. REV. 1015 (1984) (also calling for better preparation in oral arguments).
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among lawyers,1 7 Zauderer weakens the hand of state regulators. Statements
by the Court that lawyers are not above trade more than justify advertising
by lawyers. They suggest that lawyers are likewise not above using the tricks
of trade, including deceptive advertising. To paraphrase the Court, it is at
least somewhat incongruous' for the Court both to suggest that most lawyers
will abide by their solemn oaths to uphold the integrity of their profession
and yet remove from their hands the tools which they have long used to
police themselves.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has never extended the full protection of the first
amendment to commercial speech. It has repeatedly announced that the
states are free to regulate such speech in the advancement of substantial
state interests. Although most states and the majority of members of the
bar have in the past been opposed to unfettered advertising by lawyers, the
Court's decision in Zauderer demonstrates that any imagined interests in
maintaining the professionalism of lawyers or in enforcing rules of ethics
fail to qualify as substantial state interests. The states continue to attempt
to identify such interests, only to find that the Court recognizes fewer and
fewer such interests as justifying regulation of commercial speech.
Raymond S. Sokolowski
157. See supra note 49. "The horde of lawyers that descended on the disaster at Bhopal,
India, brought the American judicial system into worldwide disrepute." Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d
at 649.
158. Cf. supra note 155 (quoting from the opinion in Bates).
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